Abstract We propose to supplement the democratic election mechanism by threshold contracts. A threshold contract stipulates a performance level that a politician must reach in order to obtain the right to stand for reelection. "Read my lips" turns into "read my contract". Politicians can offer threshold contracts during their campaigns. Equilibrium threshold contracts are welfare improving and do not violate the liberal principle of free and anonymous elections in democracies.
Introduction
Democracies are-and should be-built on the fundamental principles of free and anonymous elections. Consequently, future reelection is uncertain. For instance, highly competent challengers may emerge at the reelection stage, thus lowering politicians' reelection chances even if they have performed well in the past. Newly emerging issues during campaigns may also influence voting behavior. The randomness of a politician's reelection chances increases further when the benefits from the politician's efforts cannot be observed with sufficient precision, or when benefits are affected by external shocks. Consider a reform of the judiciary system as an example for the former case, or a labor market reform as an example for the latter case. 1 Uncertainty in future reelections may not provide politicians with sufficient motivation to exert a socially desirable amount of effort, as good performance may not secure reelection. In this paper we show that adding a threshold contract to the election mechanism can increase social welfare without undermining the liberal principles of free and anonymous voting in democracies. A threshold contract stipulates the minimum performance level a politician must achieve in order to obtain the right to stand for reelection. Thus, it penalizes low effort more heavily than the reelection mechanism does and increases the marginal benefit of effort. The politician either reacts to such threshold contracts by increasing effort to enhance his reelection chances, or he does not find it worthwhile to meet the threshold and chooses zero effort. A suitable design of the threshold contract can obviate the latter possibility and welfare may be increased.
We consider a model in which an elected politician who is motivated by the prospect of holding office can exert effort on a public issue. The effort creates benefits for the public which are affected by noise, either due to measurement problems or to shocks. The politician's reelection chances are determined by a mixture of backwardand forward-looking voting behavior. Hence, the reelection decision does not only depend on the effort exerted by the politician and consequently the reelection mechanism does not provide him with sufficient motivation to exert the socially optimal amount of effort. We allow a court to stipulate a threshold contract that the politician must accept upon election. This contract prescribes a performance level the politician must achieve in order to earn the right to stand for reelection. We show that optimally designed threshold contracts can increase social welfare.
Subsequently we extend the model and allow politicians to offer the threshold contracts themselves during their campaigns. We show that optimal contracts are offered provided the politicians have the same competence, which is measured by the marginal costs of exerting effort. If the politicians differ in competence, then a second-best contract is offered, and the politician with the higher competence will be elected.
Our paper contains a proposal to supplement the election mechanism in democracies by incentive contracts. While the initial literature (e.g., Gersbach 2002; Gersbach and Liessem 2003) has examined incentive contracts prescribing utility or monetary transfers after a politician has been reelected, we focus in this paper on thresholds for reelection. 2 Such threshold contracts do not violate the fundamental liberal principles of free and anonymous elections in democracies, as voting behaviour is unrestricted. Moreover, all individuals are eligible as candidates except the incumbent operating 1 The potential benefits in terms of reduction of unemployment rates can be thwarted by negative macroeconomic shocks, which may make it very difficult for voters to assess the effort exerted by the politician pursuing such reforms. 2 While in our paper we combine threshold contracts for politicians with the democratic requirements of free and anonymous elections, there is a rapidly growing range of literature on incentive contracts for central bankers where democratic requirements play no role. This was initiated by Walsh (1995a,b) , and developed by Persson and Tabellini (1993) , Lockwood (1997) , Svensson (1997) and Jensen (1997) .
